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Abstract
On October 11, 2011, a non-governmental organization called ActionAid published a report
condemning the FTSE 100 firms for holding an unusually large number of subsidiaries in
tax havens. Urging the government to implement appropriate actions, the report raised the
firms’ costs of holding tax haven subsidiaries. After this event, the stock prices of the
nonfinancial firms experienced a 0.9% abnormal drop (corresponding to about £9 billion in
market capitalization). Those better-governed firms and those with larger shares of subsidiaries
in tax havens experienced larger drops. We find some evidence that government scrutiny,
reputation, and investor sentiment were plausible channels of such a negative impact.
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1. Introduction
Holding subsidiaries in tax havens, a firm can create value by enlarging its set of
trading opportunities and reducing tax; however, without additional checks and balances, the
management can misuse these opportunities to undermine shareholders.1 Do tax havens, on
the net, provide value to shareholders? To answer this question, we conduct an event study on
the largest publicly-listed firms in the United Kingdom. A rare event occurred on October 11,
2011. ActionAid, an international non-governmental organization (NGO), published a report
entitled “Addicted to Tax Havens: The Secret Life of the FTSE 100” (ActionAid, 2011).2 This
highly-publicized report presents all the subsidiaries of the Financial Times Stock Exchange
(FTSE) 100 firms and their locations in an online spreadsheet.3 The title of the report suggests
that the FTSE 100 firms had a noticeable presence in tax havens. As of July 26, 2011, they held
over 30,000 subsidiaries, 8,492 of which were located in tax havens.4
We follow Fisman (2001), who estimated the value of political connections for Indonesian
listed firms by using news on the unexpected health problems of President Suharto. In our
context, amid the several high-profile austerity programs in the U.K., the ActionAid report
aimed to arouse public anger and urge the British government to “get tough” and “crack down”
their presence in tax havens. The event likely raised the future costs for firms to hold subsidiaries
in tax havens because politicians during that time were highly motivated to agree with the report
and further condemned the firms and their tax haven subsidiaries. They did so and thus directly
elevated the expected probability that the British government would “get tough” on these firms.
However, expecting the government to scrutinize all firms together at once was unrealistic.
Such a change in expectation varied across firms. In particular, firms that held a large share
1For example, refer to the analysis in a related study conducted by Desai et al. (2007).
2Further details of the event are in the Online Appendix.
3The event is not a corporate event, which is a problem of event studies examined by Hirshleifer (2001). “One
explanation, event selection, is that a firm’s decision whether and when to engage in the event depends on whether
there is market mis-valuation. A second possibility, manipulation, is that around the time of the action the firm
reconfigures other information reported to investors in order to induce mis-valuation.” This political event, similar
to President Suharto’s health in Fisman (2001), is exogenous to firms, thereby lending credibility to the event study.
4These tax havens are in the list compiled by the Government Accountability Office of the U.S. Congress; see
their publication “International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in
Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions,” December 2008.
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of their subsidiaries in tax havens relative to those that held a small share were likely to be
scrutinized sooner. As such, ActionAid (2011) should affect these firms more. Examining the
changes in firm value caused by this event provides an estimate of the value tax havens bring to
shareholders.
In Section 2, we use a model to highlight the underlying theoretical mechanisms through
which the event affects firm value. A value-maximizing firm deliberately chooses its presence
in tax havens, taking into consideration the associated benefits and costs (Desai et al., 2006a).5
The benefits associated with the presence in tax havens include increased trading opportunities
and reduced taxes. The associated costs involve direct costs and difficulty dealing with the
tax authority. Detecting management misconduct, if any, such as extracting private benefits
from shareholders (i.e., agency cost), is also made difficult by tax havens. Stronger corporate
governance makes any form of misconduct difficult to go unnoticed (Desai et al., 2007).6 The
model therefore relates firm value, managerial diversion, offshore tax havens, and locating assets
in tax havens within a value-maximizing framework. It predicts that firm value decreases with
the cost of locating assets in tax havens, particularly among those better-governed firms.
One may argue that shareholders do not welcome corporate inversion, a practice used
by firms to relocate their legal domiciles to tax havens while maintaining their operations in
high-tax jurisdictions. This issue is different from the one investigated in this study because the
firm in our model selects the locations of its subsidiaries rather than its own legal domiciles.
In reality, while relocating subsidiaries can be frequent, changing legal domiciles among the
FTSE100 firms is a relatively rare corporate decision.
Was the event relevant and significant?
Considering that the success of a report depends on its effect on the society, ActionAid
had the incentive to release the report at the “right” time. We argue that ActionAid (2011)
5One may wonder whether investors have preferences over their companies’ investments in tax havens. In
our model, firms choose an appropriate combination of subsidiaries located in tax havens and non-tax havens to
maximize shareholder value. Therefore, ex ante shareholders may prefer more or fewer tax haven subsidiaries
depending on how these subsidiaries create firm value.
6A firmmay also incur other costs when using tax havens. For example, additional organizational costs may be
involved, shareholders may be confused about which parts of the business are profitable, or shareholders become
concerned about the legitimacy of the firm’s large accounts.
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was a relevant and significant event to firms. First, in addition to widespread media coverage,
a number of British politicians created a scene in response to ActionAid (2011). For two
consecutive days, two groups of members of parliament (MPs) sponsored and signed two early
day motions in response to the report. They urged the government, the U.K. tax authority, and
the HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) to take immediate actions and address such dubious
organizational strategies. Second, the political environment prior to the event date suggested
that the British government and the HMRC had incentives to take actions. These actions include
addressing the skyrocketing budget deficit in the U.K., public anger toward tax-avoidance
activities, especially among large firms, the scandals of the HMRC, the British government’s
plan to tackle avoidance activities, and consumer boycott activities.7 Third, the ActionAid
report aroused the attention of the media (and the public) about the tax-avoidance activities
of U.K. firms. Our Factiva search shows that the media echoed the moves of the politicians and
the government by more frequently reporting the tax-avoidance activities of these firms after
ActionAid (2011). Specifically, a surge in U.K.-specific articles concerning the tax-avoidance
activities of U.K. firms occurred after the event. Within a quarter before the event, three U.K.-
specific articles related to tax-avoidance activities were noted; within two quarters after the
event, 34 related articles were found. In the U.S. (as a control group), the numbers of similar
articles a quarter before and two quarters after the event were 1 and 3, respectively.8 Fourth,
the literature suggests that firms and managers have reputation concerns on tax activities (e.g.,
Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2014, Ernst and Young 2014).9
Did the event causally reduce the share prices of the FTSE 100 firms?
Section 3 presents our empirical analysis. Our baseline estimation examines whether
these firms registered negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the [0, 1] event
window. We use a multi-factor market model to distinguish firm-specific stock price movements
from market-wide price movements (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). We find that non-financial
7The Online Appendix also provides the political background.
8See the Online Appendix for the detailed results.
9For instance, Graham et al. (2014) survey on 600 corporate tax executives in the U.S. showed that reputation
concerns are important in explaining the firms’ decisions to engage in tax-planning activities. Ernst and Young’s
(2014) survey on 830 tax and finance executives in 25 jurisdictions indicated that firms are concerned about the
media’s attention to their tax activities.
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FTSE 100 firms registered CARs of −0.9% from day 0 to day 1.10 This reduction was not
small; it was about £9 billion in market capitalization or 1.5% of the tax revenue of the U.K.
government in 2011. Furthermore, better-governed firms registered a bigger loss. The CARs
would be 0.76 percentage points more negative if a firm of corporate governance standard was
at the third quartile rather than at the first quartile.
We perform several robustness checks. We check the extent to which our event was news
to the market. The media and many NGOs (including ActionAid) had been agitating about tax
havens being a vehicle for firms to avoid paying taxes. NGOs are not legally obliged to prevent
their own news from leaking out before their official release. We also check the presence of
any delayed market response. We use different pre-event and post-event windows and found no
significant market reactions. This finding suggests that prior news leakage and delayed market
responses are unlikely to be serious concerns. We also perform a placebo test on matched firms
in France and Germany. Given that the event was unlikely to affect comparable French and
German firms, these firms should not have had any abnormal returns. Indeed, they did not
exhibit abnormal price movements.
Did firms register negative CARs because of their tax haven subsidiaries?
We address this issue in Section 3.5. If different interest groups and the British
government in particular contemplated scrutinizing the firms in light of ActionAid (2011), they
would likely begin with only several firms. Firms with an unusually large share of tax haven
subsidiaries are more likely to be picked. These firms should thus register more negative CARs.
Our results show such a pattern. This pattern is robust to the various definitions of “tax havens.”
For instance, Delaware, a popular location for FTSE 100 firms’ subsidiaries, was regarded by
ActionAid (2011) as a tax haven. Excluding Delaware from the list of tax havens does not affect
our results. In addition, several tax havens are more of a “red flag” than others; they immediately
elicit the attention of tax collectors and are more likely to be on their “hit” lists. We find that
firms with a higher share of their subsidiaries in these “red flag” havens (expressed as a share
of number of subsidiaries, number of foreign subsidiaries, or number of haven subsidiaries)
10We focus on non-financial firms; including financial firms would provide similar results.
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registered more negative CARs.
What were the channels through which the report lowered firm value?
We explore the following four plausible channels in Section 3.6. First, the firms’
consumers might buy elsewhere if the report indeed aroused public anger.11 Second, the report
directly damaged the reputation of firms. Third, the report caused the investors to believe
that firms would face increased political scrutiny for their presence in tax havens. Lastly, the
news was disliked by certain groups of people who were holding or might hold these firms’
shares, thus indirectly increasing the firms’ future financing costs. We divide the sample among
different types of firms according to the proxies of these plausible channels and compared the
CARs of the different types of firms. In sum, we obtain evidence suggesting that the second,
third, and fourth channels are the likely channels.
1.1. Related literature
Our study relates to the literature that studies the effects of tax avoidance on firm value,
including the investigations conducted by Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Hanlon and
Slemrod (2009).12 Desai and Dharmapala (2009) examine the relation between corporate tax
avoidance (measured by the “book-tax gap”) and firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) and found
that tax avoidance does not exert a direct effect on firm value; instead, it exerts a positive effect
on firms with strong governance. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) use an event-study methodology
to examine the market reaction to news that a firm has engaged in aggressive tax behavior. They
found a negative market reaction to these news; the effect is more negative in the retail sector
but less so for firms with a high cash effective tax rate.
Notably, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) focus on tax
avoidance activities rather than tax havens per se. By contrast, our study focuses on a different
issue: whether tax havens generally bring value to a firm. Tax havens are not merely about
11This channel is motivated by the British consumers’ boycotting Starbucks in 2012 because of its tax avoidance
scandals. See the report “UK Uncut protests over Starbucks ‘tax avoidance”’ on December 8, 2012 at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20650945.
12Related to this literature are studies examining the relationship between tax avoidance and firm performance
or policies. For example, see Graham and Tucker (2006), Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Dyreng et al. (2013),
Hanlon et al. (2015), and Brooks, Godfrey, Hillenbrand, and Money (2016).
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tax avoidance for the following reasons. First, firms can have legitimate reasons to set up a
subsidiary in a tax haven other than avoiding tax. For instance, several Caribbean tax havens
specialize in reinsurance business and have developed the necessary legal infrastructure; a Hong
Kong subsidiary can be conducive to the firm’s business in China. Second, a firm can avoid tax
without an offshore tax haven (e.g., tax planning between two states within the U.S.).13
This study also contributes to the growing literature that examines how tax havens affect
non-tax havens at the country level (see the surveys of Hines 2010, Hanlon and Heitzman 2010,
etc.). A strand of this literature examines the effects of tax havens on non-tax havens. Desai
et al. (2006a,b) show that tax havens can reduce the cost of trading with high-tax jurisdictions
and thus promote investment and economic activities there. For instance, using debt financing
from haven subsidiaries helps a firm lower its tax burden in trading with a high-tax jurisdiction.
Rose and Spiegel (2007) show that countries with a tax haven nearby have a highly competitive
banking sector with significant financial depth. Devereux (2012) show that tax havens reduced
the average corporate tax rate among member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) from roughly 47% in 1983 to around 27% in 2012. Hong
and Smart (2010) determine the theoretical conditions under which tax competition benefits
competing countries.14
Our study also relates to Bennedsen and Zeume (2015) who hand-collect data on
subsidiary information for over 17,000 firms in 52 countries to investigate the motives of these
firms for establishing subsidiaries in tax havens. They find that tax haven subsidiaries are
13To see the similarities and differences between the issue of “tax avoidance versus firm value” studied by Desai
and Dharmapala (2009) and Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) and the issue “tax havens versus firm value” studied by
the current authors, let 퐴 and 퐵 represent the sets of business activities associated with tax havens and with tax
avoidance, respectively, in a Venn diagram. The two sets overlap, but they are not necessarily identical. 퐴 = 퐵
implies that a Californian firm that exploits the tax code differences between California and Oregon to lower its
tax cannot be regarded as avoiding tax because neither California nor Oregon is a tax haven. Meanwhile, when a
British firm finds Bermuda an appropriate base for its reinsurance business, every transaction involved has to do
with tax avoidance. These counterexamples are in the non-overlapping areas of 퐴 and 퐵 and suggest that “how
much do tax havens bring to the table?” and “how much does tax avoidance bring to the table?” are two related
but different questions.
14With various base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) policies across the world, in which the OECD has
received the most attention, research has moved beyond simple descriptive statistics by carefully estimating the
extent of BEPS. (Dharmapala, 2014) survey state-of-the-art estimation methods used in the literature by using
both aggregated and firm-level data. He also estimated that increasing the tax rate difference between the parent
firm’s country and the subsidiary’s country by 10% would increase the pretax income reported by the subsidiary
by 8%. (Dharmapala, 2014) conclud that around 2% to 4% shift in the parents’ income is a reasonable estimate.
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utilized to serve tax and entrenchment motives. We incorporate these two elements in our
theoretical model. Our results for the FTSE 100 firms complement Bennedsen and Zeume’s
(2015) results for international firms.
ActionAid (2011) has also been used by other studies as an exogenous event. Dyreng
et al. (2016) examine whether the FTSE 100 firms changed their corporate tax behavior after
the release of the ActionAid report. They found that those firms that did not fully disclose their
subsidiaries to the Companies House began to disclose; the firms also reduced their usage of
tax havens relative to other FTSE 100 firms which, before the release of the report, were in
full compliance with the disclosure rule.15 Moreover, the effective tax rates of these firms also
increased. Dyreng et al. (2016) document these changes as responses to the public pressure
generated by ActionAid (2011). Their results suggest that ActionAid (2011) successfully
induced certain public pressure.
2. Theoretical Motivation
In our empirical analysis, we estimate the market reaction of the FTSE 100 firms to the
release of ActionAid (2011) and investigate the different market reactions among firms with
different corporate governance standards. We motivate our empirical analysis by modeling a
sequential-move game between a firm and its manager; this game incorporates the models in
Desai et al. (2006a) and Desai et al. (2007). We discuss the intuition in the paper and relegate
the modeling details in Appendix A.
In stage 1 of the game, the firm picks the levels of investment in tax and non-tax havens
to maximize profit. Upon observing the investments in stage 1, the manager decides the amount
to be diverted in stage 2. Investment in tax havens not only increases the firm’s output but also
helps the firm reduce its tax payment. However, investing in tax havens includes both the direct
cost of investing in tax havens and the difficulties associated with dealing with the government,
clarifying and explaining to the tax authority, the politicians, and the general public, and the
15The U.K.’s Companies Act of 2006 requires firms to disclose the location and name of all their subsidiaries
to the Companies House. ActionAid reported on February 2011 that 49 of the FTSE 100 firms did not fully
disclose information about their subsidiaries. ActionAid filed a complaint at the Companies House. See http:
//www.actionaid.org.uk/news-and-views/actionaid-attempts-to-lift-the-veil-of-secrecy-around-tax-havens.
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firm’s potential reputation damage. Furthermore, the manager can privately benefit by diverting
the resources located in tax havens. When a firm has strong corporate governance, resource
diversion by the manager becomes difficult.16 With other things being equal, the same amount
of investment in tax havens benefits a better-governed firm.
In the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium investment level in tax havens
maximizes firm value. The equilibrium level of managerial diversion, which is a function of the
cost of investing in tax havens and the level of corporate governance, is taken into consideration
in firm value maximization. We obtained comparative statics showing that an increase in the
cost of investing in tax havens decreases firm value. Given that the report by ActionAid (2011)
increases this cost, it should lower the share prices of firms. In addition, considering that better-
governed firms have good checks and balances and are therefore able to prevent their managers
from misusing tax haven subsidiaries to divert resources, our model predicts that these firms
are affected more significantly by the increase in the cost of investing in tax havens (in absolute
term, and also in relative term under a sufficient condition).
Our model considers how corporate governance standards affect the value of firms
with different investment amounts in tax havens; it also suggests that the shape of the firm’s
production function also plays a role. To the extent that the functional form of the production
function is not correlated with firm tax haven investment, our estimation of the differential effect
of the event caused by corporate governance standard would not be biased. Other factors do
determine a firm’s production function and are thus correlated with firm tax haven investment
(Desai et al. 2006b). This condition motivates us to control these other relevant factors in our
estimation.
3. Empirical Analysis
Our event date is October 11, 2011, which is the release date of ActionAid (2011). This
event induced an increase in the costs for firms to hold subsidiaries in tax havens. We measure
16Bennedsen and Zeume (2015) documented an example in which the CFO of the fallen Enron, Andrew Fastow,
established a network of 881 offshore subsidiaries, through which he and his friends managed to divert at least USD
42 million to their own accounts.
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the decrease in firm value by CARs. We are aware of neither evidence suggesting that investors
systematically under-estimated the firms’ presence in tax havens, nor evidence showing that
the market systematically mis-priced FTSE 100 firms. Therefore, rather than asserting that
investors were ignorant of their firms’ presence in tax havens and ActionAid (2011) informed
them, we view ActionAid (2011) as giving out news on the increased likelihood that the British
government and other interest groups would “get tough” on their presence in tax havens.17
3.1. Estimation of abnormal returns
FollowingMorck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), we use the following multi-factor market model
to eliminate the effect of other news that would affect all stocks in the U.K. market to determine
the stock price reaction to the ActionAid report.18
푟푖푡 = 훼푖 + 훽1푖푟푚푡 + 훽2푖
(
푟푈푆,푡 + 푒푈푆,푡
)
+ 훽3푖푟£,푡 + 훿0퐸푡 + 휀푖푡, (1)
where 푟푖푡 is the stock return for firm 푖; 푟푚푡 and 푟푈푆,푡 are the market returns in the U.K. and the
U.S. at period 푡, respectively; 푒푈푆,푡 is the exchange rate of the British pound per U.S. dollar; 푟£,푡
is the return of the British pound effective exchange rate index;19 퐸푡 is a dummy indicating an
event window; and 휀푖푡 is the error.
To measure 푟푚푡, we use the average return value-weighted by market capitalizations
among non-FTSE 100 U.K. firms20 We include the market return in the U.S. (measured by
the return of the S&P 500 Index) as a second factor because the British economy was open to
foreign capital and the U.S. market might affect the returns of British firms. The expression of
17One might think that this contradicts with Dyreng et al. (2016) who find that half of the firms did not report all
their subsidiaries to Companies House but subsequently did so after the report. Such an ex-ante non-compliance,
however, does not automatically support the statement that investors systematically mis-infer firms’ usage of tax
havens. This is analogous to saying that even if firms are not filing every piece of information relevant to their
businesses, say, to the SEC, that does not mean that the capital market would systematically mis-price the firms.
18A two-factor model was used by Desai and Hines (2008), but they used a more conventional two-stage
approach by first running firm-specific time-seriesmarketmodels to obtain each firm’s cumulative abnormal returns
(퐶퐴푅푖) and regressing 퐶퐴푅푖 on the variables of interests. When we adopted this two-stage approach, our resultsare similar
19This index is obtained from the Bank of England.
20If investors expect that using tax havens presents more troubles not only to the FTSE 100 firms but also to
the non-FTSE 100 firms listed in the U.K. market, then our estimate that uses non-FTSE 100 firms as a benchmark
would underestimate the effect of tax havens on firm value. Doing so also makes it more difficult for us to identify
a significant effect.
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푟푈푆,푡 + 푒푈푆,푡 is used to translate the return into British pounds. Including the British pound real
exchange rate index as a third factor further controls for the possible effect on firms with foreign
subsidiaries.
Our coefficient of interest is 훿0. It captures the average daily abnormal return around
the event period due to ActionAid (2011). Given that October 11, 2011 is day 0, the CAR
within the [0, 1] event window should be 2 × 훿0. Similarly, if we use a 푘-day event window
in the regression, the CAR during this period would be 푘 × 훿0. Given that 휀푖푡 in equation (1)
is likely to be correlated because of the common event day affecting our sampled firms, we
follow the procedure of Dube et al. (2011) to estimate a panel regression of (1) and reported the
standard errors as provided by the maximum of robust standard errors, standard errors clustered
by trading days, and standard errors clustered by firms.21
To test our hypothesis that the negative market reaction is stronger among the better-
governed firms, the baseline market model (1) is extended as follows:
푟푖푡 = 훼푖 + 훽1푖푟푚푡 + 훽2푖
(
푟푈푆,푡 + 푒푈푆,푡
)
+ 훽3푖푟£,푡 + (훿0 + 훿1퐶퐺푖 + 훾푍푖) × 퐸푡 + 휀푖푡, (2)
where퐶퐺푖measures the corporate governance standard of the firm and푍푖 contains other control
variables.
We use the governance index (Gov41) from Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011)
to measure the corporate governance standard. This index is based on 41 firm-level governance
attributes covering four broad subcategories, including board of directors, auditing, anti-
takeover provisions, and compensation and ownership. A high Gov41 index indicates strong
corporate governance. The corporate governance measure for each firm was obtained as the
average of the governance indexes between 2004 and 2008. Considering that the corporate
governance standard evolves slowly over time, the average governance index is a good proxy
for the corporate governance standard of the sampled firms in 2011. In the vector of covariates ,
we include several other firm characteristics that may be related to the firms’ use of tax havens or
21The advantage of estimating abnormal return in a panel regression manner instead of the traditional firm-by-
firm market-model residual approach is the flexibility in adjusting for standard error when the events are clustered
(Binder 1985a,b; Smith et al. 1986).
− 10 −
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
tax avoidance (e.g., Desai et al. 2006b, Dyreng et al. 2016, Graham et al. 2014, and Bennedsen
and Zeume 2015) and may thus explain the market reactions. These characteristics include firm
size (proxied by log of total assets), multinationality (measured by log of the number of non-tax
haven countries where the firm’s subsidiaries are located), inventory–to-total assets ratio, R&D-
to-total assets ratio, capital expenditure-to-total assets ratio, profitability, and asset tangibility.
In several specifications, we also consider firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) based on
data from the Asset4 database.22 Details on these variables are provided in Appendix B.
3.2. Sample construction and descriptive statistics
We focus on non-financial firms for three major reasons.23 First, British financial firms
have long been closely affiliated with the City of London and were all highly regulated.
Second, during and after the financial crisis, the British government nationalized a substantial
amount of ownership from financial firms (Scott, 2009). The affiliation with the City of
London, government ownership, and regulations specific to financial firms caused difficulties
in predicting market reactions to the event. Third, financial firms had other special reasons to
hold foreign subsidiaries (e.g., transacting with domestic clients’ offshore businesses) that may
differ from those of other types of businesses. Including them in our estimation may confound
our results.
Among the 100 FTSE firms listed in ActionAid (2011), 76 were non-financial firms.24
Their total market capitalization exceeded £1,000 billion.25 Table 1 reports the summary
statistics of the number and share of subsidiaries in tax havens for the sampled firms and other
key variables. On average, a firm had approximately 307.2 subsidiaries, 72.4 of which were
located in tax havens and 234.8 of which were located in non-tax havens. The average share of
subsidiaries located in tax havens was about 23.9%, meaning that a firm on average had 1 out of
22Asset4 is a private firm founded in 2003 and was acquired by Thomson Reuters in 2009. They began to collect
annual data on firms’ environmental, social, and governance performance in 2003. This dataset has been used by
Cheng et al. (2014) to study international corporate governance and social responsibility issues.
23In his empirical tax sheltering model for U.S. firms, Lisowsky (2010) also focused on non-financial firms
only.
2465 of these firms had available corporate governance measure (Gov41).
25Amihud (2002) and Amihud et al. (2005) pointed out that illiquidity is one of the most important market
frictions that affect asset prices. This problem, however, should not be a serious concern among the firms in our
sample.
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4 of its subsidiaries located in tax havens.26 Figure 1 plots the CARs of the non-financial firms
in the sample from day −1 to day 15. These CAR estimates were from model (1) for each firm.
The average price decreased on the day of the report. The negative market reaction appeared to
persist for 15 trading days.
[Table 1 and Figure 1 are about here.]
Firms’ presence in tax havens
What should be a measure of firms’ presence in tax havens? This question would be more
serious if a firm-level regression of firm value is to be conducted on firm presence in tax havens.
Not only should we come up with a correct measure that is comparable across firms, we also
have to tackle endogeneity. Conducting an event study alleviates these issues. However, the
differences between the shares and numbers of haven subsidiaries still need to be identified.27
Using the number of tax haven subsidiaries to proxy for a firm’s presence in tax havens is
similar to using the number of legal entities of a jurisdiction to proxy for its economic activities,
which is at best a crude measure. We therefore follow Desai et al. (2006b) and use the share
of tax haven subsidiaries instead. However, the share is not without problems. We provide
two arguments. First, the diagrams and tables in ActionAid (2011) and its spreadsheet file
highlight the number and shares of tax haven subsidiaries for the FTSE 100 firms, suggesting
that ActionAid might actually want people to focus on these measures. Second, given that
interest groups (such as the government, tax authority, NGOs, and the general public) regard an
unusually large share of a firm’s subsidiaries located in tax havens as alarming, we believe that
our event study provides something meaningful about the value tax havens attribute to firms.
Figure 2 visualizes the relation between the number of subsidiaries and both the number
and share of subsidiaries located in tax havens of the sampled firms. Subfigure (a) shows a
strong positive correlation between the number of subsidiaries and the number of tax haven
26The Online Appendix contains a table showing the extent to which the firms’ subsidiaries were located in tax
havens.
27Unlike Berkshire Hathaway’s annual shareholders’ meeting, a spectacular event that lasts for an entire day and
exhausts the chairman (and probably the vice-chairman too), an annual shareholder meeting of a haven subsidiary
may last for less than a minute. They are usually held in batches. Tax haven activities can be easily scaled up and
down without necessarily increasing the number of haven subsidiaries.
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subsidiaries (the slope of the fitted line is 0.257 with a 푝-value of < 0.001). The firms with a
large number of tax haven subsidiaries were those with many subsidiaries. Using the absolute
number of tax haven subsidiaries in our event study appears to be inappropriate. Meanwhile,
subfigure (b) does not show a clear relationship between the number of subsidiaries and the
share of tax haven subsidiaries (the slope of the fitted line is −0.006 × 10−3 with a 푝-value
= 0.841).28
[Figure 2 is about here.]
The number of offshore subsidiaries might also be due to previous M&As. For instance,
when a firm acquires another firm with many tax haven subsidiaries, because of “inertia” of
ownership, the acquirer inherits these subsidiaries and appears to be actively using tax havens.
ActionAid (2011) would then give a false alarm to interest groups regarding these firms. In our
model, a firm’s choice of investments in tax and non-tax havens should maximize its profit. If
a firm has acquired subsidiaries through M&As and the investment amount does not maximize
its value, it would benefit by adjusting the number of subsidiaries. Two pieces of evidence
suggest that firms adjust their numbers of subsidiaries. Table 10 shows some summary statistics
on the use of subsidiaries by the FTSE 100 firms in a follow-up report by ActionAid (2013).
Comparison of the changes in the number of subsidiaries in the 2011 and 2013 lists reveals a
large amount of within-firm variation in the number of subsidiaries. Bennedsen and Zeume
(2015) find that after the signing of the Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), firms
responded by moving their subsidiaries from tax havens that entered the TIEAs to other havens
that did not (also known as “haven hopping”).
Relation between tax haven subsidiaries and firm characteristics
We run firm-level regressions to examine the association between the share of subsidiaries
located in tax havens and several firm characteristics.29 Table 2 shows the association, with 1-
28 The figure also shows that three firms have over 1,000 offshore subsidiaries. If these firms are excluded, a
positive and statistically significant association between the number of subsidiaries and the number of tax haven
subsidiaries would still be obtained; however, an insignificant association would be observed between the number
of subsidiaries and the share of tax haven subsidiaries.
29The dependent variable is a fraction between 0 and 1, so we estimated a fractional Probit model (Papke and
Wooldridge, 1996). The results of OLS regressions are similar.
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digit SIC industry fixed-effects included and standard errors clustered at the firm level. For
Column (1), we adopted the tax haven definition in ActionAid (2011) to construct the share
of tax haven subsidiaries. The large shares of subsidiaries in tax havens were from firms with
relatively large shares of intangible assets, inventory, R&D expenses, and low profitability.
Some may find the classification of ActionAid (2011) debatable. For instance, ActionAid
(2011) considers Delaware a tax haven. Delaware was, however, a popular location for the
FTSE 100 firms’ subsidiaries. Reclassifying Delaware as a non-tax haven reduced the average
number of subsidiaries in tax havens to about 49.1 among the FTSE 100 firms, and their share
of subsidiaries in tax havens decreased to about 17.4%. We also note that different tax havens
served different purposes. For instance, several tax havens offered low corporate tax rates
(which might have facilitated tax avoidance activities), whereas others offered secrecy services
(which might have facilitated tax evasion activities). We therefore use alternative definitions of
tax havens to ensure that our main results are not affected by the manner by which ActionAid
(2011) classifies jurisdictions.
In Column (2), we compute the share of tax haven subsidiaries by excluding Delaware
from the ActionAid (2011) definition. In Column (3), we employ another definition of tax
havens from Hines and Rice (1994) involving 41 countries and territories.30 Among these tax
havens, Hines and Rice (1994) further identify 7 large havens (the “Big 7”), each of which had
over one million populations as of 1982. The rest are called “Dot” havens. The “Big 7” havens
include Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland. Desai
et al. (2006b) argue that the large workforce and capital in the “Big 7” havens may provide
additional operational benefits. Meanwhile, the presence of a firm in “Dot” havens is likely
to elicit the attention of tax collectors. Column (4) only includes “Dot” havens. Column
(5) considers “Secret” tax havens. The Tax Justice Network (TJN) regularly publishes the
“Financial Secrecy Index,” which ranks jurisdictions around the world that provide financial
secrecy.31 We use the 2011 version of the index and compute the firms’ shares of subsidiaries
30The correlation coefficient between the tax haven definition of Hines and Rice (1994) and that of ActionAid
is about 0.76.
31TJN is an independent international advocacy group consisting of researchers and activists with a shared
concern about tax avoidance, tax competition, and tax havens. Refer to their website at http://www.taxjustice.net/.
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in the following havens listed among the top 10 in the index: Switzerland, Cayman Island,
Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jersey, and Bahrain.
The results based on these alternative tax haven definitions are fairly consistent. An
exception is that the use of “Secret” tax havens appears to be negatively related to firm size
(proxied by log of total assets) and positively related to the multinationality measure (log of the
number of non-haven countries where a firm has a subsidiary).
[Table 2 is about here.]
3.3. Baseline empirical results
We estimate models (1) and (2) by using data from 390 trading days (from day −266 to
day 123). The stock returns of the firms are expressed in percentage points. In the baseline
analysis, we examined the market reactions over the [0, 1] event window.
Table 3 shows the regression results. For brevity, the firm-specific intercepts and the
coefficients of the market return are not presented. Columns (1) to (3) show the results of
model (1) in which we interacted 퐸푡 (the dummy indicating the [0, 1] event window) with a
constant so that its coefficient is the average abnormal returns over the [0, 1] event window. In
Column (1), we considered all FTSE 100 firms; the coefficient−0.395 is statistically significant,
indicating that CAR is about −0.790 (= −0.395 × 2) percentage points. As mentioned earlier,
the financial firms were highly regulated; because of their clients, they had special needs to use
foreign subsidiaries. These factors might have affected the market reaction to these firms and
thus confounded the results in Column (1).32 In Column (2), we focus on the 76 non-financial
firms. CAR was larger (about −0.934 = −0.467 × 2 percentage points) in these firms. In
Columns (3) to (5), we consider the subsample of non-financial firms with available Gov41
data. In these 65 firms, CAR was about −0.924(= −0.462 × 2) percentage points.
[Table 3 is about here.]
The coefficient of Gov41 in Column (4) is −6.941 and is statistically significant, which
means that the negative market reaction was stronger among better-governed firms. One may
32If we estimate model (1) using the 24 financial firms, we still obtain a negative coefficient, but it is not
statistically significant.
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argue that this result contradicts that in the literature on CSR.33 Given that better-governed firms
are also more socially responsible, this result contradicts the result in the literature that firms
with good CSR practices tend to be well protected against the revelation of news about the poor
practices of firms. To address this concern, we add the overall social responsibility measure
from Asset4 as another covariate. The regression results are shown in Column (5).34 In this
specification, the coefficient of Gov41 is still negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that our results are still similar even when CSR is considered.35
In terms of economic significance, the decline of 0.9 percentage points in CAR was
equivalent to a drop of roughly £9 billion in market capitalization.36 Supposing that the
corporate governance standard of a firm increased from the first quartile (0.524) to the third
quartile (0.580), the estimate suggests a more negative CAR by 0.76[= 2× (−6.766)× (0.580−
0.524)] percentage points. This figure corresponds to about £7.6 billion inmarket capitalization.
One way to interpret this amount is that it would have been the additional agency cost of
managerial rent diversion associated with the use of tax havens if a firm at the first quartile
of the corporate governance measure was suddenly rated at the third quartile instead.
How much was £9 billion? hrough the use of tax havens, firms can reduce taxes payable
to the U.K. government and/or other governments. To provide readers a sense of the scale of
the tax payable, we assumed that all of the £9 billion was collected by the U.K. tax authority.
According to the U.K. Budget 2011,37 the total tax revenue was about £589 billion. Therefore,
the drop in market capitalization by the sampled firms following the release of the ActionAid
report was roughly 1.5% (= 9∕589) of the tax revenue in 2011.
33Please see Vanhamme and Grobben (2009) and Godfrey (2005).
34In this specification, only 63 firms with available data are included. Consistent with the literature, the
coefficient of the overall social responsibility measure is positive but not significant, suggesting that good CSR
tends to offer firms good protection against bad news.
35Another possibility is that our main results are driven by the governance measure we used. Alternatively, we
used the corporate governance score from Asset4 and re-estimated the regressions in Columns (4) and (5). Our
regression results are similar. For brevity, these results are not reported but are available upon request.
36The total market capitalization of the sampled firms was about £1,000 billion.
37See http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf.
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3.4. Robustness checks
We perform several robustness checks. First, we examine market reactions before and
after the event. On the one hand, the news might have leaked out early because ActionAid,
being an NGO, was not legally obliged to maintain secrecy about its future report release. On
the other hand, our baseline results do not capture any delayed market reactions to the report. To
investigate these two issues, we re-estimate the regression model in (1) for several pre-event and
post-event windows. The results are presented in Table 4. Panel (A) shows the results using
the following pre-event windows: [−20,−1], [−10,−1], and [−2,−1]. In all these windows,
the coefficients of average abnormal return are all statistically insignificant. Panel (B) shows
the results using the following post-event windows: [1, 2], [1, 10], and [1, 20]. Similarly, the
coefficients of average abnormal return are all statistically insignificant. Therefore, no evidence
exists to support the possibilities of news leaking before the event and delayed market reactions
afterward.
[Table 4 is about here.]
In the baseline regressions, we used an event window of [0, 1]. Another concern is that the
market might have over-reacted to the event within this short window. Did the market reactions
persist over time? Figure 1 shows a negative CAR up to 15 trading days. We also estimate model
(1) using wider event windows from [0, 2] up to [0, 5]. The regression results, shown in Table
5, indicate that the negative market reactions persisted up to four trading days after the event.
The coefficient of average abnormal return in the [0, 4] event window is −0.315, suggesting
that CAR is about −1.575 = (−0.315 × 5) percentage points. If wider event windows are used,
precisely measuring the market reactions to the event may be difficult (MacKinlay 1997), as can
be seen from the relatively large standard errors.
[Table 5 is about here.]
We also perform a placebo test on matched French and German firms. The matched firms
are listed in French CAC and German DAX with a similar firm size, leverage, and corporate
governance score. These firms were not directly affected by ActionAid (2011) and should not
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exhibit similar abnormal price movement patterns as our sampled firms. We use different event
windows around the key event date and did not find any statistically significant market reactions
from these matched firms. We also conduct another robustness check to estimate the abnormal
returns for the non-financial FTSE 250 firms using the same market model used in the baseline
analysis, in which the “market” excludes both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms. For the [0, 1]
event window, we find no significant negative reactions among these FTSE 250 firms to the
ActionAid report.38
3.5. Did the firms register abnormal returns because of their tax haven subsidiaries?
The empirical results presented in the previous sections support the view that FTSE
100 firms registered negative CARs because of the ActionAid report. Considering that the
negative market reactions were driven by investors’ expectation of the increasing cost of holding
subsidiaries in tax havens, firms that located a larger share of their subsidiaries in tax havens
should experience a larger decrease in price.
To analyze whether the market reacted differently for different firms, we divide the
sampled firms according to the median share of subsidiaries located in tax havens and re-
estimate model (1) separately for each of the subsamples. We also use different definitions
of tax havens. Table 6 shows our findings. The tax haven definition used in Panel (A) is the
original definition according to ActionAid (2011). In Panel (B), we remove Delaware from the
list of tax havens. In Panel (C), we use the definition of tax havens provided by Hines and Rice
(1994). In Panels (D) and (E), we focus on “Dot” and “Secret” havens, respectively.
In the table, the cells in Columns (1) and (2) represent the coefficient of the average
abnormal return in model (1) for firms with below-median and above-median shares of
subsidiaries located in tax havens. In all these regressions, the market reaction was stronger
among firms with above-median shares of subsidiaries located in tax havens.39 For instance,
among the firms with below-median shares of tax haven subsidiaries (according to the definition
of ActionAid 2011), CAR over the [0, 1] event window was −0.804 (= −0.402 × 2) percentage
38For brevity, these results are not reported but are available upon request.
39If we divide the firms according to the shares of subsidiaries in the “Big 7” tax havens, we will find that CAR
was more negative among above-median firms.
− 18 −
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
points, whereas that among the above-median firms was −1.052 (= −0.526 × 2) percentage
points.
[Table 6 is about here.]
In Table 6, the share of haven subsidiaries are computed with the total number of
subsidiaries as the denominator. To what extent are these results driven by this denominator?
In other words, when the interest groups calculated which firms to first pick on, they might have
concentrated on firms with substantially high shares of subsidiaries located at notorious tax
havens relative to either the total number of foreign (i.e., non-U.K.) subsidiaries or the number
of total haven subsidiaries as defined in ActionAid (2011). Table 7 shows that firms with large
shares of subsidiaries located at “Dot” and “Secret” tax havens, out of either the total number
of tax haven subsidiaries defined in ActionAid (2011) (Panels (A) and (B)) or the total number
of foreign subsidiaries (Panels (C) and (D)), registered more negative CARs. In sum, the report
caused the firms to register negative CARs, and the drop was likely caused by their tax haven
subsidiaries.
[Table 7 is about here.]
Did better-governed firms experience a larger drop than poorly governed firms simply
because they had relatively more to lose? If so, the market should have reacted negatively
irrespective of the firm’s shares of subsidiaries in tax havens. To investigate this issue, we
divide the sampled firms according to the median share of subsidiaries located in tax havens
and re-estimated model (2) for each of the subsamples. Similarly, we use different definitions
of tax havens for these subsample regressions. Table 8 presents the results. Stronger corporate
governance was significantly associated with a larger drop only among firms that held relatively
more subsidiaries in tax havens. By contrast, among firms that held relatively fewer tax haven
subsidiaries, the association between corporate governance standard and market reaction was
statistically insignificant. These findings are inconsistent with the claim that better-governed
firms have a larger drop than poorly governed firms simply because they have more to lose.
[Table 8 is about here.]
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3.6. Plausible channels
We showed that ActionAid (2011) caused the non-financial FTSE 100 firms to register
negative CARs, especially those with large shares of tax haven subsidiaries. What were the
plausible channels? We examine the following four channels.
Consumer boycott
Consumers might have become less willing to buy from these firms because of ActionAid
(2011). Ex ante, at the time ActionAid (2011) was published, shareholders may not know
whether a boycott would occur and if it does, how long it may last and how severe the effect
may be on the firms. Therefore, one may argue that ActionAid (2011) caused a negative market
reaction because shareholders anticipate a potential consumer boycott in the future, which may
affect future profitability. If this was a significant channel, more negative CARs are to be
expected for firms engaging in business-to-consumer (B-to-C) businesses rather than those in
business-to-business (B-to-B) businesses. To investigate this issue, we single out firms in retail
industries (i.e., those with 2-digit SIC between 52 and 59). Only 8 such firms were identified
out of the 76 non-financial firms. In an unreported analysis, we find negative yet statistically
insignificant market reactions to these 8 firms. Nevertheless, the lack of statistical significance
could also be due to the small sample size (MacKinlay, 1997). We are not convinced that we
have sufficient evidence in support of this channel.
Reputation
ActionAid (2011) might have directly damaged the reputation of firms. If reputation was
a significant channel, more negative CARs would be observed among firms with high reputation
capital. This is also a challenging channel to test because no universal and objective measure
of firm reputation exists.
We test this channel in two indirect ways. First, we exploit the possibility that firms
that have successfully built up high reputation capital appear socially responsible. We use two
measures of social responsibility from the Asset4 database. The first one measures the overall
social responsibility of the firm, and the second one specifically measures the firms’ reputation
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within the general community.40 We then divide the firms into subgroups according to these two
measures and estimate the CARs for the firms in different subgroups. The regression results are
presented in Panels (A) and (B) of Table 9. In both panels, the market reactions to firms with a
high social responsibility score or awareness of reputation are more negative. These results are
consistent with the view that ActionAid (2011) directly damaged firms’ reputation.
Second, Graham et al. (2014) suggest that large firms are very concerned about their
reputation. We therefore use firm size as a proxy for reputation capital, with the knowledge that
a firm with a bad reputation can still possibly be very concerned about its reputation. We divide
the firms into large and small firms (according to total assets) and estimated the CARs for the
firms in different subgroups. Panel (C) of Table 9 shows that the market reaction to the small
firms was more negative than that to the large firms.41
To the extent that the firms that were very concerned about reputation were those
that had built up much reputation capital, these results are against the claim that ActionAid
(2011) directly damaged the reputation of firms. However, if “concern about reputation” does
not correlate with reputation capital strongly, our results will not contradict those of social
responsibility measures in Panels (A) and (B). These results also suggest that better-governed
firms experienced a larger drop not because they were large, which is consistent with Table 8.
Altogether, we have some but not strong evidence that ActionAid (2011) might have directly
damaged the reputation of firms.
Government scrutiny
ActionAid (2011) might have successfully triggered investors to believe that firms using
tax havens are likely to be penalized or heavily investigated by the government and the HMRC,
40The first measure is the SOCSCORE variable, which measures “a company’s capacity to generate trust and
loyalty with its workforce, customers, and society through its use of best management practices. It is a reflection
of the company’s reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its
ability to generate long-term shareholder value.” The second measure is the SOCO variable, which “measures
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness toward maintaining the company’s reputation within
the general community (local, national, and global). It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its license to
operate by being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods, staff time, etc.), protecting public health (avoidance of
industrial accidents, etc.) and respecting business ethics (avoiding bribery and corruption, etc.).” Both definitions
are according to ASSET4 documentations.
41We get similar results when we measure firm size by the number of offshore subsidiaries owned by these
firms.
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which were the aims of the report. If the government and the HMRC did pick on these firms,
those that had many subsidiaries in tax havens, especially the notorious ones, are likely to be
first to be picked on.
Table 6 shows the more negative market reactions among the firms with larger shares
of their subsidiaries located in tax havens, where tax havens are defined in five different ways.
Table 7 shows that the pattern persisted evenwhenwe compute the shares of subsidiaries located
in “Dot” and “Secret” havens out of either the total haven subsidiaries or the foreign subsidiaries.
As suggested by Desai et al. (2006b), “Dot” havens provide a few operational benefits to firms
and are thus likely to be associated with tax-avoidance activities. Meanwhile, “Secret” havens
provide financial secrecy that might facilitate tax evasion. Firms with numerous subsidiaries in
“Dot” or “Secret” havens are likely to attract the attention of the government and HMRC and
face an increased likelihood of investigation. The fact that these firms registered more negative
CARs is consistent with the following view: that ActionAid (2011) triggered the investors to
expect that the authorities would “toughen” their actions on these firms.
Investor sentiment
Finally, ActionAid (2011) might have disgusted some investors by indirectly increasing
their future financing costs. If this was true, stronger market reactions would be observed among
firms that have a high level of retail investor ownership. Given that we do not have any direct
measure of retail investor ownership of the FTSE 100 firms, we could not test this channel
directly. Instead, we use a measure of institutional ownership concentration — the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of institutional ownership — from FactSet Ownership (LionShares)
(see Ferreira andMatos 2008).42 A higher value of HHI indicates that ownership by institutional
investors is more concentrated; in contrast, a lower value indicates that ownership is more
diverse.43 However, a firm with a low HHI does not necessarily have a high level of retail
investor ownership. To the extent that this was the case, if investors’ negative reactions following
ActionAid (2011)were indeed relevant, we should expect strongermarket reactions toward these
42We did not use such measures as total share of institutional ownership because they may be a proxy for the
corporate governance standards of the firms.
43Among the sampled firms with available data, the correlation between HHI of institutional ownership and the
total share of institutional ownership is −0.006 with a 푝-value = 0.966.
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firms with a low HHI.
Panel (D) of Table 9 shows the results. Among firms with a low HHI, the implied CAR
over the [0, 1] window was −1.156 percentage points, whereas among firms with high HHI,
the implied CAR over the [0, 1] window was −0.708 percentage points. The stronger market
reaction toward the firms with a low HHI provides some support to the claim that ActionAid
(2011) disgusted some investors.
[Table 9 is about here.]
Overall, we obtain some evidence suggesting that ActionAid (2011) damaged the
reputation of firms, created the expectation that government penalty would be applied, and
disgusted several investors through the news regarding these firms.44
4. Aftermath: Updated List of Subsidiaries Held by the
FTSE 100 Firms in ActionAid (2013)
On May 23, 2013, ActionAid (2013) published a press release entitled “Almost Half of
All Investment Into Developing Countries Goes Through Tax Havens, ActionAid reveals.” This
press release came with an updated list of subsidiaries owned by the FTSE 100 firms in a similar
format as that in ActionAid (2011). ActionAid began updating in September 2012 by using the
most updated information available in 2011 and 2012.45 We compare the use of tax havens
by the firms between 2011 and 2013; the analysis suggests that the ActionAid report (and the
subsequent changes in the news coverage) could be associated with the firms’ adjustments in
the use of offshore subsidiaries.
44Another plausible channel is that the firms are required to reorganize their activities which may be costly and
lead to higher tax payments in the future. Indeed, as we will show in the next section, firms do change the locations
of subsidiaries between tax havens and non-tax havens between 2011 and 2013. However, we are unable to come
up with a direct measure of such a cost, precluding us from directly testing this potential channel.
45The updated list is downloadable at: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/actionaid_
ftse100_subsidiary_data_20122013_final_final_for_website.xlsx.
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4.1. Descriptive statistics
We found 64 of the 76 non-financial firms in the 2011 list in the 2013 list. Panel (A)
of Table 10 shows the summary statistics for the use of subsidiaries of these firms according
to the 2013 list. Comparison of the summary statistics reported in Table 1 shows that on the
average, not much change occurred in the number of subsidiaries located in tax and non-tax
havens and the share of subsidiaries located in tax havens (according to different definitions).
However, a large amount of within-firm variation occurred over time, as shown in Panel (B) of
Table 10, in which we computed the changes in the use of subsidiaries. For instance, several
firms removed as many as 80 subsidiaries in tax havens, whereas others increased theirs by as
many as 45. In terms of the share of subsidiaries in tax havens, several firms reduced their share
by 20 percentage points, whereas others increased theirs by 9 percentage points.
As shown in Table 11, we further examine the correlations between the changes in the
use of subsidiaries with CAR over the [0, 1] event window and the changes in negative news
coverage of these firms’ tax-avoidance activities. This table shows that a positive correlation
of 0.258 exists between the change in the share of subsidiaries in tax havens and CAR, and
the correlation is statistically significant. Firms experiencing a larger drop in CAR reduce
relatively more of their shares of tax haven subsidiaries. A positive correlation also exists
between the change in the number of subsidiaries in tax havens and CAR, but the correlation is
not statistically significant. Negative and statistically significant correlations exist between the
changes in negative news coverage and the changes in numbers of subsidiaries in total in both
tax and non-tax havens.
[Tables 10 and 11 are about here.]
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the changes in the use of subsidiaries located
in “Dot” or “Secret” havens (on the horizontal axis) and the changes in the use of subsidiaries
located in other havens (on the vertical axis) between 2011 and 2013. Subfigures (a) and (b)
show the changes in the numbers and shares of subsidiaries, respectively. Both figures show
a negative relationship between the two variables. The slope of the fitted line in subfigure (a)
is −0.031 (푝-value = 0.263) and that in subfigure (b) is −0.234 (푝-value = 0.035). Overall,
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a substitution pattern appears to exist: firms move their subsidiaries from “Dot” and “Secret”
havens into “acceptable” tax havens.
[Figure 3 is about here.]
4.2. Did the market respond to ActionAid (2013)?
With a similar market model as that in (1), we estimate the market reactions to ActionAid
(2013) over the [0, 1] window (day 0 is May 23, 2013). Table 12 presents the empirical results.
As shown in Column (1), CAR over [0, 1] is about −0.076(= −0.038 × 2) percentage points;
however, it is statistically insignificant. Columns (2) to (9) reveal whether heterogeneous
effects exist in terms of the firms’ changes in the use of subsidiaries (absolute numbers and
shares) indicated by the 2011 and 2013 reports. We find that firms with larger increases in the
number and share of subsidiaries located in tax havens have more negative CARs, although
these coefficients are all statistically insignificant.
[Table 12 is about here.]
4.3. Which firms reduced or increased their tax haven use?
As shown in Panel B of Table 10, between 2011 and 2013, several firms reduced their
number of subsidiaries located in tax havens, whereas others did the opposite. Did the former
firms have the largest negative CARs in 2011? Table 11 shows that a positive and significant
correlation exists between the price response to ActionAid (2011) and the subsequent change
in the share of subsidiaries located in tax havens. Table 13 shows the five firms with the largest
CARs (“top 5”) and another five firms with the smallest CARs (“bottom 5”) during the [0, 1]
event window in 2011. The changes in the use of subsidiaries by these firms are also indicated.
Although no clear pattern was observed among these firms in terms of changes in the number
of subsidiaries, a reduction in the share of subsidiaries in tax havens was observed among the
bottom five firms.
We also examine whether firms that reduced their tax haven use derived the least benefit
from having them or whether their reputations (and thus the potential for damage) were greater.
We define two groups: Group 1 contains firms that decreased the shares of subsidiaries in
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“Dot” or “Secret” havens and increased the shares of subsidiaries in other tax havens. Group
2 contains firms that increased the shares of subsidiaries in “Dot” or “Secret” havens and
decreased the shares of subsidiaries in other tax havens. Firms that increased or decreased both
types were excluded in this definition. In Table 14, we compared CAR[0, 1] in 2011 and the
social responsibility score in 2010 and found that Group 1 has a significantly lower CAR[0, 1]
and a lower (insignificantly) social responsibility score than Group 2. This result means that
firms attempting to transfer from “Dot” or “Secret” havens to “acceptable” tax havens were
likely to be hit more severely or acquire low “reputation” as of 2011.
[Tables 13 and 14 are about here.]
5. Conclusion
We exploited the release of a report by ActionAid, a non-governmental organization
in the U.K., on tax haven subsidiaries held by the FTSE 100 firms on October 11, 2011 to
investigate whether tax havens are a treasure to firms. We argued that against the overall political
background around that time, the timely release of ActionAid’s report substantially increased the
cost of holding tax haven subsidiaries among the FTSE 100 firms. Our event study indicated that
the market reacted negatively to the release of the report, especially among the better-governed
firms. The effects were stronger among firms with a noticeable presence in tax havens.
The British government spent about £917 million to tackle tax avoidance, evasion, and
fraud in 2010 (HMRC, 2012); perhaps a substantial fraction of it concerned tax havens. How
much did the spending reduce the firms’ presence in tax havens? Howmuch did the shareholders
of the firms suffer? The follow-up report by ActionAid in 2013 suggests that the reduction
of these firms’ tax haven presence was at best marginal. Meanwhile, our study helps address
the second question. Another difficult question to address is how much tax revenue the U.K.
government could get back after spending £917 million. We believe that additional studies have
to be conducted to address this issue.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around the Event Date (Day 0 = October 11,
2011) for the Non-financial Firms (푁 = 76)
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Figure 3: Relationship Between Changes in the Use of “Dot” and “Secret” Havens and
Changes in the Use of Other Havens
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Non-financial Firms
Variable Mean S.D. Min. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max.
Number of subsidiaries 307.224 393.092 14.000 82.500 198.500 387.500 2686.000
— in tax havens 72.395 106.176 0.000 19.000 38.000 83.000 611.000
— in non-tax havens 234.829 293.815 10.000 61.000 167.500 309.500 2075.000
% of subsidiaries in tax havens 0.239 0.106 0.000 0.169 0.226 0.288 0.587
Corporate governance (Gov41) 0.552 0.043 0.439 0.524 0.556 0.580 0.639
log (Total assets) 9.229 1.339 6.989 8.072 9.129 10.168 12.684
Multinationality 3.027 0.974 0.000 2.197 3.113 3.892 4.691
Leverage 0.576 0.184 0.074 0.426 0.616 0.708 0.917
Intangible assets 0.240 0.208 0.000 0.058 0.190 0.430 0.812
Inventory 0.070 0.067 0.000 0.012 0.051 0.102 0.225
R&D 0.011 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.132
Capital expenditure 0.053 0.046 0.003 0.019 0.040 0.073 0.206
Profitability 0.150 0.078 −0.052 0.101 0.137 0.185 0.397
Asset tangibility 0.327 0.256 0.000 0.110 0.249 0.544 0.886
Corporate social responsibility 85.536 12.136 39.740 84.170 89.940 93.690 96.820
Note: 푁 = 76, except for the Corporate governance measure where푁 = 65 and for the Corporate social responsibility
measure where푁 = 63.
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Table 2: Relationship between Tax Haven Use and Firm Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ActionAid (2011)
Tax haven definition: ActionAid (2011) excluding Delaware Hines and Rice (1994) “Dot” havens “Secret” havens
log (Total assets) 0.007 −0.008 −0.046 −0.008 −0.134∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.039) (0.038) (0.052)
Multinationality −0.015 −0.012 −0.023 −0.011 0.117∗∗
(0.058) (0.049) (0.050) (0.063) (0.052)
Leverage 0.263 0.283 0.371 0.215 0.320
(0.269) (0.297) (0.286) (0.284) (0.324)
Intangible assets 0.574∗ 0.816∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.535 0.765∗∗
(0.348) (0.361) (0.338) (0.409) (0.335)
Inventory 1.377∗∗ 1.854∗∗ 2.638∗∗∗ 0.640 2.486∗∗
(0.692) (0.765) (0.912) (0.859) (1.010)
R&D 2.774∗∗ 1.601 2.804∗ 1.710 2.346∗∗
(1.339) (1.269) (1.580) (1.275) (1.084)
Capital expenditure 2.152∗∗ 3.740∗∗∗ 1.818 2.563∗∗ 2.821
(1.093) (1.169) (1.864) (1.151) (1.992)
Profitability −1.389∗∗ −1.586∗∗∗ −1.058 −1.769∗∗∗ −1.419∗
(0.562) (0.539) (0.676) (0.609) (0.767)
Asset tangibility 0.145 0.243 0.655∗∗∗ 0.191 0.531∗∗
(0.211) (0.224) (0.251) (0.251) (0.259)
Observations 76 76 76 76 76
Log likelihood −28.389 −24.109 −20.027 −25.207 −13.215
Note: The dependent variable is the share of subsidiaries in tax havens. The regressions are fractional Probit
models. In the regressions, 1-digit SIC industry fixed-effects are included. “Dot” havens are those havens that are
not “Big 7” (Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) according to Hines and
Rice (1994). “Secret” havens are those havens in top 10 of the Financial Secrecy Index (2011 version) compiled
by the Tax Justice Network. Standard errors are clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance
at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance at 1% level.
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Table 3: Market Reactions: Main Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-financial
Sample: All firms Non-financial & with Gov41 data
Average abnormal return −0.395∗∗∗ −0.467∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗ 2.632∗ 3.421∗∗
(0.108) (0.113) (0.153) (1.528) (1.657)
Corporate governance (Gov41) −6.766∗∗ −7.165∗∗
(3.010) (3.135)
log (Total assets) −0.023 −0.043
(0.089) (0.085)
Multinationality 0.296∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(0.123) (0.125)
Leverage −0.260 −0.312
(0.834) (0.868)
Intangible assets −0.447 −0.780
(1.003) (1.020)
Inventory −0.838 −1.157
(1.868) (1.789)
R&D −6.396 −6.177
(7.023) (6.411)
Capital expenditure −8.672∗ −7.107
(4.640) (4.991)
Profitability 3.896 2.761
(3.864) (3.111)
Asset tangibility 0.531 0.126
(0.617) (0.729)
Corporate social responsibility 0.003
(0.010)
Observations 38737 29377 25250 25250 24470
Number of firms 100 76 65 65 63
푅2 0.441 0.424 0.429 0.429 0.438
Note: The event window is [0, 1]. Standard errors are given by the maximum of robust standard errors, standard
errors clustered by trading days, and standard errors clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗:
significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance at 1% level.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks: Abnormal Returns Before and After Event
Panel (A): Abnormal returns before event
(1) (2) (3)
Event window: [−20,−1] [−10,−1] [−2,−1]
Average abnormal return 0.172 0.284 −0.121
(0.142) (0.203) (0.083)
Observations 29377 29377 29377
Number of firms 76 76 76
푅2 0.424 0.424 0.424
Panel (B): Abnormal returns after event
(1) (2) (3)
Event window: [1, 2] [1, 10] [1, 20]
Average abnormal return −0.261 −0.018 −0.066
(0.230) (0.121) (0.097)
Observations 29377 29377 29377
Number of firms 76 76 76
푅2 0.424 0.424 0.424
Note: Standard errors are given by the maximum of robust standard errors, standard errors clustered by trading
days, and standard errors clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗:
significance at 1% level.
Table 5: Robustness Checks: Wider Event Windows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event window: [0, 2] [0, 3] [0, 4] [0, 5]
Average abnormal return −0.291∗ −0.245∗ −0.315∗∗∗ −0.186
(0.157) (0.127) (0.119) (0.154)
Observations 29377 29377 29377 29377
Number of firms 76 76 76 76
푅2 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424
Note: Standard errors are given by the maximum of robust standard errors, standard errors clustered by trading
days, and standard errors clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗:
significance at 1% level.
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Table 6: Differential Market Reactions By Tax Haven Use
Panel (A): Tax haven definition according to ActionAid (2011)
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.387∗∗∗ −0.547∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.182)
Observations 14720 14657
Number of firms 38 38
푅2 0.405 0.440
Panel (B): Tax haven definition according to ActionAid (2011) excluding Delaware
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.330∗∗ −0.604∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.171)
Observations 14720 14657
Number of firms 38 38
푅2 0.422 0.426
Panel (C): Tax haven definition according to Hines and Rice (1994)
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.451∗∗ −0.484∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.171)
Observations 14720 14657
Number of firms 38 38
푅2 0.388 0.463
Panel (D): “Dot” havens
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.327∗∗ −0.607∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.181)
Observations 14720 14657
Number of firms 38 38
푅2 0.406 0.439
Panel (E): “Secret” havens
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.414∗∗∗ −0.520∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.168)
Observations 14720 14657
Number of firms 38 38
푅2 0.445 0.402
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient of the average abnormal return in model (1). The event window is [0, 1].
“Below median” and “Above median” are the samples of firms with below-median and above-median shares of
subsidiaries located in tax havens. “Dot” havens are those havens that are not “Big 7” (Hong Kong, Ireland,
Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) according to Hines and Rice (1994). “Secret” havens
are those havens in top 10 of the Financial Secrecy Index (2011 version) compiled by the Tax Justice Network.
Standard errors are given by the maximum of robust standard errors, standard errors clustered by trading days,
and standard errors clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance
at 1% level.
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Table 7: Differential Market Reactions By the Shares of “Dot” and “Secret” Tax Havens
Subsidiaries
Panel (A): By share of “Dot” haven subsidiaries out of total haven subsidiaries
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.310∗∗ −0.572∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.181)
Observations 14557 14430
Number of firms 38 37
푅2 0.394 0.455
Panel (B): By share of “Secret” haven subsidiaries out of total haven subsidiaries
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.372∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.159)
Observations 14557 14430
Number of firms 38 37
푅2 0.448 0.403
Panel (C): By share of “Dot” haven subsidiaries out of total foreign subsidiaries
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.354∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.181)
Observations 14947 14430
Number of firms 39 37
푅2 0.434 0.414
Panel (D): By share of “Secret” haven subsidiaries out of total foreign subsidiaries
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.350∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.166)
Observations 14820 14557
Number of firms 38 38
푅2 0.479 0.365
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient of the average abnormal return in model (1). The event window is [0, 1].
“Below median” and “Above median” are the samples of firms with below-median and above-median values of
the corresponding firm characteristic. “Dot” havens are those havens that are not “Big 7” (Hong Kong, Ireland,
Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) according to Hines and Rice (1994). “Secret” havens
are those havens in top 10 of the Financial Secrecy Index (2011 version) compiled by the Tax Justice Network.
Standard errors are given by the maximum of robust standard errors, standard errors clustered by trading days,
and standard errors clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance
at 1% level.
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Table 8: Do Better Governed Firms Have More to Lose?
Panel (A): Tax haven definition according to ActionAid (2011)
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Corporate governance (Gov41) −3.745 −12.261∗∗
(3.832) (5.757)
Observations 13550 11700
Number of firms 35 30
푅2 0.410 0.449
Panel (B): Tax haven definition according to ActionAid (2011) excluding Delaware
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Corporate governance (Gov41) −2.615 −10.940∗∗
(3.784) (4.293)
Observations 13550 11700
Number of firms 35 30
푅2 0.430 0.428
Panel (C): Tax haven definition according to Hines and Rice (1994)
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Corporate governance (Gov41) −0.198 −10.844∗∗∗
(4.990) (4.034)
Observations 13160 12090
Number of firms 34 31
푅2 0.381 0.483
Panel (D): “Dot” havens
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Corporate governance (Gov41) −1.479 −9.678∗∗
(3.708) (4.376)
Observations 13160 12090
Number of firms 34 31
푅2 0.418 0.441
Panel (E): “Secret” havens
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Corporate governance (Gov41) −1.931 −6.807
(4.209) (5.895)
Observations 12870 12380
Number of firms 33 32
푅2 0.444 0.415
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient of the corporate governance measure in model (2). The event window is
[0, 1]. “Belowmedian” and “Abovemedian” are the samples of firmswith below-median and above-median shares
of subsidiaries located in tax havens. “Dot” havens are those havens that are not “Big 7” (Hong Kong, Ireland,
Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) according to Hines and Rice (1994). “Secret” havens
are those havens in top 10 of the Financial Secrecy Index (2011 version) compiled by the Tax Justice Network.
Standard errors are given by the maximum of robust standard errors, standard errors clustered by trading days,
and standard errors clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance
at 1% level.
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Table 9: Differential Market Reactions By Different Firm Characteristics
Panel (A): By overall social responsibility
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.363∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.132)
Observations 13550 13260
Number of firms 35 34
푅2 0.416 0.463
Panel (B): By firms’ reputation within the general community
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.377∗∗ −0.422∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.124)
Observations 13550 13260
Number of firms 39 37
푅2 0.413 0.464
Panel (C): By total assets
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.515∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.175)
Observations 14720 14657
Number of firms 38 38
푅2 0.375 0.483
Panel (D): By Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of institutional ownership
(1) (2)
Below median Above median
Average abnormal return −0.578∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗
(0.196) (0.181)
Observations 10920 10820
Number of firms 28 28
푅2 0.481 0.333
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient of the average abnormal return in model (1). The event window is
[0, 1]. “Below median” and “Above median” are the samples of firms with below-median and above-median
values of the corresponding firm characteristic. Standard errors are given by the maximum of robust standard
errors, standard errors clustered by trading days, and standard errors clustered by firms. ∗: significance at 10%
level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance at 1% level.
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Table 10: Summary Statistics for the Use of Subsidiaries in the Updated List
Panel (A): The use of subsidiaries according to the 2013 list
Variable Mean S.D. Min. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max.
Number of subsidiaries 321.094 395.808 14.000 97.500 235.500 426.000 2697.000
— in tax havens 77.781 108.825 0.000 19.500 46.000 94.000 618.000
— in non-tax havens 243.313 294.259 9.000 67.500 198.500 323.000 2079.000
% of subsidiaries in tax havens 0.239 0.108 0.000 0.180 0.216 0.272 0.580
– excluding Delaware 0.172 0.107 0.000 0.105 0.156 0.208 0.580
– “Dot” havens only 0.186 0.101 0.000 0.137 0.167 0.206 0.568
– “Secret” havens only 0.066 0.065 0.000 0.033 0.054 0.077 0.474
Panel (B): Changes (Figures in the 2013 list minus the corresponding figures in the 2011 list)
Variable Mean S.D. Min. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max.
Number of subsidiaries −5.766 72.917 −311.000 −18.000 0.000 12.500 249.000
— in tax havens 0.422 15.324 −80.000 −2.000 1.000 5.000 45.000
— in non-tax havens −6.188 61.287 −284.000 −14.500 −0.500 10.500 204.000
% of subsidiaries in tax havens −0.000 0.034 −0.201 −0.009 0.002 0.015 0.090
– excluding Delaware −0.001 0.029 −0.165 −0.013 0.000 0.012 0.067
– “Dot” havens only −0.001 0.029 −0.176 −0.008 0.003 0.010 0.072
– “Secret” havens only −0.002 0.014 −0.050 −0.005 0.000 0.005 0.028
Note: The sample includes 64 non-financial firms which appear in 2011 and 2013 lists of tax haven use published
by ActionAid.
Table 11: Correlations between Changes in the Use of Subsidiaries, CAR, Firm
Characteristics, and Changes in Negative News Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ No. of Δ No. of Δ % of
Δ No. of subsidiaries in subsidiaries in subsidiaries in
subsidiaries tax havens non-tax havens tax havens
CAR[0, 1] −0.066 0.019 −0.083 0.258
(0.601) (0.882) (0.513) (0.040)
Social responsibility −0.080 −0.069 −0.077 0.000
(0.549) (0.603) (0.561) (0.998)
Profitability 0.023 0.050 0.015 0.142
(0.855) (0.696) (0.905) (0.265)
Δ Negative news coverage (1 quarter) −0.347 −0.429 −0.306 0.038
(0.005) (0.000) (0.014) (0.768)
Δ Negative news coverage (2 quarters) −0.246 −0.255 −0.229 −0.051
(0.050) (0.042) (0.069) (0.688)
Note: 푝-values of the correlation coefficients are in parentheses.
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Table 13: Changes in the Use of Subsidiaries for Firms with Largest and Smallest CARs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No. of subsidiaries % of subsidiaries in tax havens
CAR[0,1] in tax in non-tax Excluding “Dot” “Secret”
(%) All havens havens All Delaware havens only havens only
Top 1 1.306 −35 2 −37 0.016 −0.001 0.019 −0.002
Top 2 1.189 −23 3 −26 0.012 −0.001 0.016 −0.002
Top 3 1.182 11 7 4 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Top 4 1.097 104 8 96 −0.032 −0.029 −0.004 −0.019
Top 5 1.020 9 5 4 0.017 0.017 0.018 −0.002
Bottom 1 −3.596 6 3 3 −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 −0.024
Bottom 2 −2.573 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bottom 3 −1.920 −152 −59 −93 −0.030 −0.029 −0.033 0.005
Bottom 4 −1.637 249 45 204 −0.201 −0.165 −0.176 −0.042
Bottom 5 −1.526 22 2 20 −0.050 −0.035 −0.048 −0.015
Note: Among the non-financial firms which appear in both the 2011 and 2013 lists of tax haven use published by
ActionAid, Top 1 to 5 firms have the largest CARs over [0, 1] and bottom 1 to 5 firms have the smallest CARs
over [0, 1] in 2011.
Table 14: Differences in CARs and Social Responsibility Scores Among Firms
Substituting From “Dot” or “Secret” Havens to Other Tax Havens and Those
Substituting From Other Tax Havens to “Dot” or “Secret” Havens
(1) (2) (3)
Mean of Group 1 Mean of Group 2 Difference
CAR[0, 1] −0.813 −0.239 −0.574∗∗
Social responsibility 84.107 87.878 −3.771
Note: Group 1 contains firms decreasing the shares of subsidiaries in “Dot” or “Secret” havens and increasing the
shares of subsidiaries in other tax havens; Group 2 contains firms increasing the shares of subsidiaries in “Dot”
or “Secret” havens and decreasing the shares of subsidiaries in other tax havens. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗:
significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance at 1% level.
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Appendix
A. The Model: A Sequential-move Game with 2 Stages
In stage 1, a firm decides the amounts of investment in non-tax havens and tax havens (퐾
and 퐾 푡, respectively). There is a common shadow cost represented by 휆 (which, without loss
of generality, can be set to 1); different unit costs are given by 푐 and 푐푡, respectively. Let 휏(퐾 푡)
be the firm’s effective tax rate as a function of 퐾 푡. Since tax havens can help firms lower their
taxes, assume 휕휏(퐾 푡)∕휕퐾 푡 < 0.
The firm’s revenue consists of two parts: [1] 푄(퐾,퐾 푡) is taxed, where 푄1 > 0, 푄11 < 0,
푄2 > 0, and푄22 < 0. Assume푄12 ≥ 0, i.e., the investment in non-tax havens will not lower the
marginal product of the investment in tax havens, vice versa. [2] The non-taxed part given by
푄푡(퐾 푡) ≥ 0.46 This part corresponds to those businesses the firm takes in tax havens for which
they are not taxed in non-tax havens. Whether these investments make the firm more profitable,
however, depends on the extent of managerial diversion, denoted by 푑. The firm’s profit is given
by:
휋 = [1 − 휏(퐾 푡)]푄(퐾,퐾 푡) +푄푡(퐾 푡) − (푐퐾 + 푐푡퐾 푡) − 푑. (A.1)
In stage 2, the firm’s manager can divert resources (denoted 푑) from both non-tax havens
and tax havens, subject to some costs, to maximize her utility:
푈 = 푑 − 훾푑
2
2(훼퐾 +퐾 푡)
, (A.2)
Stronger corporate governance corresponds to a higher 훾 . Under stronger corporate governance,
it becomes harder for the manager to divert firm resources for personal benefits. Diverting
resources is easier when firm has more investments. Assume 훼 ≠ 1, i.e., diverting resources
from non-tax havens and tax havens entails different costs.
46This set up allows the possibility that tax havens enlarge the business opportunity set. This is the case when
휕[푄(퐾,퐾 푡) +푄푡(퐾 푡)]∕휕퐾 푡 > 0.
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Subgame-perfect equilibrium
In stage 2, given 퐾 and 퐾 푡, the manager chooses 푑 to maximize utility. The first order
condition gives:
푑∗ = 훼퐾 +퐾
푡
훾
. (A.3)
Substituting it into (A.1), the profit function of the firm becomes:
휋 = [1 − 휏(퐾 푡)]푄(퐾,퐾 푡) +푄푡(퐾 푡) − (푐퐾 + 푐푡퐾 푡) − 훼퐾 +퐾
푡
훾
. (A.4)
In stage 1, the firm chooses 퐾 and 퐾 푡 to maximize (A.4). The first order conditions are:
퐾 ∶ [1 − 휏(퐾 푡)]휕푄(퐾,퐾
푡)
휕퐾
= 푐 + 훼
훾
, (A.5)
퐾 푡 ∶ [1 − 휏(퐾 푡)]휕푄(퐾,퐾
푡)
휕퐾 푡
− 휕휏(퐾
푡)
휕퐾 푡
푄(퐾,퐾 푡) + 휕푄
푡(퐾 푡)
휕퐾 푡
= 푐푡 + 1
훾
. (A.6)
The subgame-perfect equilibrium is that the firm’s optimal invest 퐾∗ in non-tax havens
and (퐾 푡)∗ tax havens as defined by (A.5) and (A.6), and the manager diverts 푑∗ = (훼퐾∗ +
(퐾 푡)∗)∕훾 . A few results follow.
Result 1: Firm value decreases with the cost of using tax havens: 휕휋∗∕휕푐푡 < 0.47
Result 2: Investment in tax havens decreases with its cost: 휕(퐾 푡)∗∕휕푐푡 < 0.
This result comes from differentiating the two first order conditions in (A.5) and (A.6)
with respect to 푐푡 and applying the Cramer’s Rule to get:
휕(퐾 푡)∗
휕푐푡
=
휋11
휋11휋22 − 휋212
, (A.7)
where 휋11 is the second derivative of 휋 with respect to 퐾 and so on. By standard assumptions
of maximization, 휋11 < 0 and 휋11휋22 − 휋212 > 0. Therefore, 휕(퐾 푡)∗∕휕푐푡 < 0; the firm’s demand
curve for tax havens is downward-sloping.
47This result follows directly from the Envelope Theorem.
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Result 3: Investment in tax havens increases with the strength of corporate
governance: 휕(퐾 푡)∗∕휕훾 > 0.
This result comes from differentiating the two first order conditions in (A.5) and (A.6)
with respect to 훾 and applying the Cramer’s Rule:
휕(퐾 푡)∗
휕훾
=
−휋11∕훾2 + 훼휋12∕훾2
휋11휋22 − 휋212
. (A.8)
Since 휋11 < 0, 휋12 = (1 − 휏)휕2푄∕(휕퐾휕퐾 푡) − (휕휏∕휕퐾 푡)(휕푄∕휕퐾) > 0, and the denominator is
positive, the above term is positive.
Result 4: Under an increase in the cost of using tax havens, a firm with stronger
corporate governance
(a) has a larger drop in its absolute value : 휕2휋∗∕(휕푐푡휕훾) < 0; and
(b) has a larger drop in its relative value (i.e., 휕2 log휋∗∕(휕푐푡휕훾) < 0 ) if:
1
(퐾 푡)∗
휕(퐾 푡)∗
휕훾
> 1
휋∗
휕휋∗
휕훾
.
To see Result 4(a), we note that:
휕2휋∗
휕푐푡휕훾
= 휕
휕훾
(휕휋∗
휕푐푡
)
= 휕
휕훾
(
−(퐾 푡)∗
)
= −휕(퐾
푡)∗
휕훾
< 0, (A.9)
since 휕(퐾 푡)∗∕휕훾 > 0 by Result 3.
To see Result 4(b), a change in the firm value in percentage is expressed as 휕 log휋∗∕휕푐푡
and 휕2 log휋∗∕(휕푐푡휕훾), where
휕2 log휋∗
휕푐푡휕훾
= 휕
휕훾
( 1
휋∗
휕휋∗
휕푐푡
)
= − 1
(휋∗)2
휕휋∗
휕훾
휕휋∗
휕푐푡
+ 1
휋∗
휕2휋∗
휕푐푡휕훾
. (A.10)
Using the previous results, we have:
휕2 log휋∗
휕푐푡휕훾
= 1
(휋∗)2
휕휋∗
휕훾
(퐾 푡)∗ − 1
휋∗
휕(퐾 푡)∗
휕훾
= −(퐾
푡)∗
휋∗
[
1
(퐾 푡)∗
휕(퐾 푡)∗
휕훾
− 1
휋∗
휕휋∗
휕훾
]
. (A.11)
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Therefore, we can see that 휕2 log휋∗∕(휕푐푡휕훾) < 0 if and only if:
1
(퐾 푡)∗
휕(퐾 푡)∗
휕훾
> 1
휋∗
휕휋∗
휕훾
. (A.12)
The left hand side of this inequality is the percentage change of tax haven use with respect to
a unit change in corporate governance standard whereas the right hand side is the percentage
change of firm value with respect to a unit change in corporate governance standard. This
inequality essentially concerns the sensitivity of tax haven investment to corporate governance
relative to that of total firm value to corporate governance. If the former is sufficiently large, then
the above inequality holds so that the model predicts that the report triggers a more pronounced
drop in the fraction of total firm value for better-governed firms.
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B. Variable Definition
Table A shows the definitions of the key variables used in the empirical analysis.
Table A: Variable definition
Variable Definition Source
Corporate
governance
The measure is based on 41 firm-level governance attributes
covering four broad subcategories:
1. Board (24 attributes): They capture the aspects of
the board of directors such as board independence,
composition of committees, size, transparency, and how
the board conducts its work.
2. Audit (three attributes): They include questions on the
independence of the audit committee and the role of
auditors.
3. Anti-takeover provisions (six attributes): They are drawn
from the firm’s charter and by-laws and refer to dual-class
structure, role of shareholders, poison pills, and blank
check preferred.
4. Compensation and ownership (eight attributes): They
deal with executive and director compensation on issues
related to options, stock ownership and loans, and how
compensation is set and monitored.
Gov41 index from
Aggarwal et al.
(2011)
Corporate social re-
sponsibility
It measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty
with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of
best management practices. It is a reflection of the company’s
reputation and health of its license to operate, which are key
factors in determining its ability to generate long term shareholder
value
Score on the Social
Responsibility pillar
from Asset4
Log (Total assets) Total assets in natural logarithm. Compustat Global
Multinationality Number of non-tax haven countries where a firm’s subsidiaries are
located, in natural logarithm.
ActionAid (2011)
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets. Compustat Global
Intangible assets Intangible assets divided by total assets. Compustat Global
Inventory Inventory divided by total assets. Compustat Global
R&D R&D expenses divided by total assets Compustat Global
Capital expenditure Capital expenditure divided by total assets. Compustat Global
Profitability Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets Compustat Global
Asset tangibility Total property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets Compustat Global
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Highlights
• On October 11, 2011, a non-governmental organization published a report
condemning the FTSE 100 firms for holding an unusually large number of
subsidiaries in tax havens.
• The report raised the firms’ costs of holding tax haven subsidiaries.
• FTSE100 nonfinancial firms experienced an average abnormal price drop of 0.9%
(or about £9 billion in market capitalization).
• Better-governed firms and firms with larger shares of subsidiaries in tax havens
experienced larger drops.
• We find some evidence that government scrutiny, reputation, and investor sentiment
were plausible channels of the negative impact.
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